Joint Defence Exercises : Showcasing Bharat’s Armour to the World in Amrit Kaal

With high hopes for significant change, Modi took office for the first time in May 2014. His forward-looking statement at the biannual gathering of his top most military commanders in December 2015, more than a year later, gave rise to sporadic rumors of impending change. Though there were a few policy changes, defense policy during his first term was largely unremarkable. For instance, the proportion of GDP devoted to defense spending dropped to all-time lows, reaching levels similar to those before the catastrophic war with China in 1962. Modi’s defense policy, in spite of his public rhetoric, fell short of expectations in practical terms and received justified criticism, at times even from active military commanders.

Possibly taking a cue from this experience, the prime minister astonished everyone early in his second term when he announced that the present military change will be spearheaded by the creation of the job of chief of defense staff. Three primary developments comprise this change, to put it broadly. First, proposals for defense reform were led from the top down by the chief of staff. Expectations were not met by the reform’s future implementation, as the government significantly increased this office’s authority. In light of this, Modi named Gen. Bipin Rawat as the first chief of staff in December 2019 and gave him command of the recently established Department of Military Affairs. The goal of Rawat is to establish integrated theater commands.

Second, Modi has given increasing priority to developing India’s own military sector. Based on information provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India has the disgraceful distinction of being the world’s biggest importer of armaments for the previous forty years. Although previous administrations have recognized this issue, their attempts to address it through policy have not worked. The Modi government has made defense manufacture a top priority under the “self-sufficient India ” (Aatmanirbhar Bharat) policy. This information has been made public. The administration has moved forward with politically sensitive initiatives like the corporatization of ordnance manufacturing in spite of resistance from labor unions. Importantly, regulations support military companies in both the public and private sectors, while efforts are still being made to attract international companies to enter this market. The largest accomplishment to date may be the engineering of a collaborative attitude inside the military and the defense sector. This relationship used to be characterized by accusation after accusation of corruption, distrust, finger-pointing, and even confusion. These parties are now urged to collaborate, and the private sector is no longer seen as a haven for immorality. Additionally, the government has encouraged the military sector to concentrate on exports, which increased by more than 700 percent between 2016 and 2019, according to one count.

The domain of military diplomacy represents the third component of change. To put it simply, the Indian military now plays a major part in indicating the country’s foreign policy goals. Previous administrations in New Delhi engaged in contentious discussions over military drills, engagements, and accords because they were unclear about the right role for the military in their foreign policy. As a result, the military was constantly forced to reconsider its goals and responsibilities. The Modi administration, on the other hand, is less concerned and has included the military into India’s broader foreign policy. The so-called fundamental agreements with the United States have been completed very swiftly, creating opportunities for more ambitious plans for the future of military-to-military relations between the United States and India. At the same time, the Indian military is increasingly willing to cooperate with allies, both inside and beyond the Quad nations. This is undoubtedly a reaction to China’s ascent and increased aggression, but the end effect is that defense diplomacy in India is being driven more closely by the Indian military. Many foreign weapons suppliers, seeing lucrative economic prospects, had parachuted into India, drawn by the country’s increased expenditure on military acquisitions and the push to produce defense equipment locally. It can be indeed said that our Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s nine years are unique, not only for the modernisation of the armed forces, but also for transforming them in terms of modern weapons, restructuring and in-depth combat strength.